A growing body of research in political science has uncovered evidence of a "split personality" among Americans when it comes to racial attitudes, whereby people express different attitudes in public than they personally hold. A common assumption is that people adjust their personal attitudes to conform to dominant social norms. At present, however, there is no theoretical model that could account for the emergence of racial norms that are at odds with people's personal attitudes. This paper proposes a simple neural model of racial attitude formation that makes an important distinction between socially shared and idiosyncratic racial attitudes. Socially shared attitudes reflect evaluations that are culturally transmitted and may not necessarily represent an individual's personal views. In contrast, idiosyncratic attitudes represent a sense of interpersonal 'chemistry' that may be at odds with dominant social norms. A computational model based on Kimura's (1983) Neutral Theory of Evolution predicts that socially shared racist attitudes may be able to coexist with, and eventually be replaced by, more favorable idiosyncratic racial attitudes.
Abstract.
A growing body of research in political science has uncovered evidence of a "split personality" among Americans when it comes to racial attitudes, whereby people express different attitudes in public than they personally hold. A common assumption is that people adjust their personal attitudes to conform to dominant social norms. At present, however, there is no theoretical model that could account for the emergence of racial norms that are at odds with people's personal attitudes. This paper proposes a simple neural model of racial attitude formation that makes an important distinction between socially shared and idiosyncratic racial attitudes. Socially shared attitudes reflect evaluations that are culturally transmitted and may not necessarily represent an individual's personal views. In contrast, idiosyncratic attitudes represent a sense of interpersonal 'chemistry' that may be at odds with dominant social norms. A computational model based on Kimura's (1983) Neutral Theory of Evolution predicts that socially shared racist attitudes may be able to coexist with, and eventually be replaced by, more favorable idiosyncratic racial attitudes.
In order to investigate racial attitudes unencumbered by considerations of social desirability and 'political correctness,' this study augments traditional survey measures with a number of reaction time based measures of non-conscious racial attitudes. Socially shared, non-conscious attitudes are measured using implicit racial priming based on a lexical decision task. Idiosyncratic non-conscious attitudes are measured using a timed trait rating procedure to measure feelings of implicit closeness towards African Americans and White Americans.
Experimental results (N=555) support the predictions derived from the computational model. They suggest that socially shared racial attitudes (as measured by implicit priming) are biased in a pro-White and anti-Black direction, even among non-White participants. This bias is interpreted as a subconscious remnant of old racist norms. On the idiosyncratic level, however, an entirely different picture emerges. Attitudes that are measured by the timed trait rating procedure are much more favorable toward African Americans. A multivariate analysis suggests that implicit closeness to Blacks drives support for race related policies such as affirmative action. Thus, idiosyncratic racial attitudes may be able to overcome the lingering effect of socially shared racist attitudes. The implications of the theoretical model and the empirical findings of this study are discussed and future research projects are proposed.
Introduction
A growing body of research in political science and social psychology has uncovered evidence of a "split personality" among Americans when it comes to racial attitudes (e.g., Devine 1989 , Terkildsen 1993 , Fazio et al. 1995 , Greenwald et al. 1995 , Kuklinski et al. 1997 , Berinsky 2004 , Feldman & Huddy 2005 . People appear to voice different attitudes in public than privately when given the opportunity to express their personal views anonymously (e.g., Kuklinski et al. 1997 ).
This discrepancy is often interpreted as a social desirability effect among White 1 Americans who engage in self-monitoring. According to this interpretation, self-monitoring White respondents may adjust their old-fashioned, unfavorable views of African Americans to a new, pro-black norm of 'political correctness'. In order to control for this social desirability effect, some researchers use Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) self-monitoring scale (e.g., Terkildsen 1993 , Berinsky 2004 , Feldman & Huddy 2005 . Other researchers attempt to measure unfavorable attitudes directly outside the respondents' awareness using reaction time measures (Devine 1989 , Fazio et al. 1995 , Greenwald et al. 1995 . They generally find a powerful pro-White and antiBlack bias among their White respondents on the non-conscious (implicit) level even among respondents who express favorable views on the conscious (explicit) level. Reviewing a large volume of evidence from the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in different domains of explicit and implicit attitudes, ranging from race and ethnicity to gender and age stereotypes, Greenwald et al.
(2002) detect a general "empirical dissociation between the two types of measures" (Greenwald et al. 2002, p. 18) . Social desirability explanations of this dissociation seem to imply that explicit attitudes are more susceptible to social norms than implicit ones. This may lead to the interpretation that implicit attitudes more faithfully represent an individual's 'personal' attitudes.
A radically different interpretation is implied by the model of dual attitudes proposed by Wilson et al. (2000) . According to this model, implicit and explicit attitude-measures tap different aspects of an individual's attitudes both of which may be influenced by personal feelings or social norms. The main difference is that implicit attitudes tend to reflect attitudes that have been rehearsed for a longer period of time and have become automatic. Such automatic responses require no conscious thought while newer attitudes require conscious effort. According to their 1 In order to emphasize the socially constructed character of the race concept names of racial and ethnic groups are capitalized in this paper even if they refer to colors (e.g., Black, White, Black Americans, and White Americans).
interpretation, explicit attitudes may be just as 'genuine' as implicit ones, and they compare the rehearsal process to motor skills such as playing the piano or playing tennis. The conscious attempt to rehearse a new musical piece or a new serve cannot be interpreted as a disingenuous attempt at yielding to social norms, but as a genuine desire to play well. Similarly, favorable attitudes towards African Americans on the explicit level may represent a genuine desire at adopting a positive attitude, rather than a superficial attempt to satisfy social norms.
Whether social norms lead individuals to publicly misstate their personally held attitudes, or whether they infuse individuals with a genuine desire to adopt and rehearse new attitudes, neither interpretation offers a scenario that could explain how these social norms may emerge.
This paper provides a simple theoretical model of racial norms evolution that is based on a few simple assumptions about neural organization and social communication. This model will be explained in the following section. A number of hypotheses are derived from the model and empirically tested based on a sample of N=555 college students in section 3. Finally, section 4 presents simulation results based on a computational version of the racial norms evolution model and compares the patterns observed in the simulations to the patterns observed in the student experiment.
A Simple Model of Racial Norms Evolution
The model of racial norms evolution proposed in this paper combines intra-personal properties of neural brain organization with inter-personal properties of social communication processes. On the intra-personal level, it assumes that sensory perceptions of internal body states and sensory perceptions of external stimuli are processed in different brain regions (see section 2.1). The model further assumes that both types of sensory perception, internal as well as external, are subjected to a process of Hebbian learning (Donald O. Hebb 1949) , whereby repeated rehearsal leads to automaticity. This process is equivalent to the rehearsal process described in Wilson's et al. (2000) dual attitude model and its neural basis will be described in greater detail in section 2.2.
Finally, on the inter-personal level, the model of racial norms evolution is inspired by Motoo Kimura's (1983) theory of neutral evolution. This principle predicts the emergence of dominant norms by random drift even in the absence of selective advantages. This aspect of the model will be described in section 2.3.
Idiosyncratic and Socially Shared Attitudes
The idiosyncratic vs. socially shared distinction is based on the assumption that sensory perceptions of internal body states (internal stimuli) are processed in different brain regions than sensory perceptions of environmental events (external stimuli). While the latter can be observed by a number of individuals at the same time, the latter is perceived only by the individual him or herself. When people communicate it is easier to reach agreement about external stimuli than about internal ones. In addition, communications by others (whether in verbal form, in body language, or other symbols) enter the individual's brain as external stimuli and are assumed to be easier to communicate to others, since they are already stored in a communicable format. In contrast, internal body states enter the brain as diffuse sensations that are more difficult to express to others. Due to high levels of interconnectivity within the brain, these two regions are not assumed to be isolated, but rather to be interconnected in a peculiar form: Idiosyncratic perceptions of internal body states can be expressed in a communicable format with probability p(idiosyncratic). This probability depends on the level of difficulty translating internal body sensations into a communicable format 2 . It may be easier, for example, to express the internal body state of 'feeling hungry' than the complex sensation of feeling a 'sense of chemistry' with a complete stranger. Socially Shared Attitudes (s). The white arrow indicates the probability that an idiosyncratic attitude will be translated into an externally communicable format, p(idiosyncratic).
It is important to note that the expression of idiosyncratically perceived internal body states is a one way street. External perceptions of environmental stimuli, including communications from others, are assumed to be unable to influence internal body states. This is not an arbitrary assumption, but is rooted in the consideration that internal body states are likely to be the exclusive domain of an individual and cannot be directly determined by external stimuli. The same external stimulus may elicit very different body reactions in two different individuals. For 2 Section 4 provides simulation results based on the model of racial norms evolution in which p(idiosyncratic) takes on various values.
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example, a seafood connoisseur and an individual that is allergic to seafood may be able to talk about "seafood" based on a socially shared understanding of language, however, it will be associated with pleasant internal body states in the connoisseur, and with highly unpleasant ones in the allergic individual. No amount of emphasis on the part of the connoisseur of how delicious seafood is will be able to eliminate the unpleasant body state in the allergic individual. Figure 1 represents the spatial distinction between idiosyncratic attitudes (i) based on the perception of internal body states and socially shared attitudes (s) based on external stimulation. It is important to note that no anatomical accuracy is implied; the spatial separation, not the exact location, is of importance for the model proposed here.
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes
In line with Wilson's et al. (2000) dual attitude model, the model of racial norms evolution assumes that frequently repeated (well rehearsed) thoughts, feelings, or motor functions are processed significantly faster than not so frequently repeated ones. This rehearsal effect is based on the principle of Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949 
Random Norms Evolution
In addition to the two intra-personal processes described in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the model of racial norms evolution contains an inter-personal element that links various individual neural networks in a social network. Within this network, neighbors communicate with one another and exchange their socially shared attitudes (denoted s in figure 1 ). The fact that they exchange socially shared attitudes rather than idiosyncratic ones is based on the fact that these attitudes are already stored in a 'communicable' format while idiosyncratic attitudes require translation into such a format (see section 2.1). When two neighbors communicate, one neighbor is randomly designated as 'persuader' and the other as 'persuadee.' The persuadee is assumed to adopt the socially shared attitude of the persuader. Since each individual has exactly the same probability of being designated 'persuader' or 'persuadee,' no selection mechanism for a particular attitude is built into the model that could explain why a given attitude becomes socially dominant.
Nonetheless, a process invariably occurs by which one out of any number of equal alternatives eventually emerges as a socially dominant majority attitude. This process, referred to in biological theory as 'random drift,' has been mathematically analyzed by Motoo Kimura (1983) in his theory of neutral evolution.
Since this evolutionary model is new to the social sciences, a brief description of its biological origin is in place. It was developed by Kimura (1983) Theory of Evolution that demonstrates how a purely random process will inevitably lead to distinct patterns in which one neutral alternative will dominate and eventually replace other equal alternatives. Kimura (1983) states: "The neutral theory asserts that the great majority of evolutionary changes at the molecular level ... are caused not by Darwinian selection but by random drift of selectively neutral ... mutagens" (Kimura 1983, S. xi) . By virtue of the fact that Kimura's theory emphasizes the formative power of random mutational processes, it has become the dominant theory of evolution on the molecular level. Interestingly, the use of random evolution models in political science precedes Kimura's neutral theory. In 1968 William N. McPhee (1968 proposed a "Campaign Simulator" (p. 169) based on similar ideas and his colleagues Jack Ferguson and Robert B. Smith applied a related model to voting behavior. Due to the popularity of Darwinian models in social science applications, however, the power of Kimura's (1983) neutral evolution remains largely unexplored in contemporary political science.
The main advantage of Kimura's (1983) random evolution model is its maximal parsimony which makes it attractive as a null model against which more restrictive theories could potentially be tested.
When all three elements of the racial norms evolution model are taken together -the distinction between idiosyncratic vs. socially shared attitudes described in section 2.1, the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes described in section 2.2 (see also Wilson et al. 2000) , and the phenomenon of 'random drift' based on Kimura's (1983) Theory of Neutral
Evolution -a number of predictions can be derived. First, due to the dynamic of Kimura's (1983) Neutral Theory Evolution, we should observe a single attitude to become a dominant social norm even in otherwise random communication processes. Based on the idea that socially shared and idiosyncratic attitudes may be processed in different brain regions (see section 2.1), the expectation naturally follows that over time idiosyncratic attitudes and socially shared ones should diverge for most individuals on topics that are widely discussed in the population.
Further, attitudes (whether idiosyncratic or socially shared) that have been held by the individual for a longer period of time should tend to become automatic due to the process of Hebbian attitude rehearsal described in section 2.2 (compare also Wilson et al. 2000) . Section 3 will discuss possible measures of implicit idiosyncratic and implicit socially shared attitudes, and it will present empirical findings based on a college student study (N=555). Section 4 will compare the patterns observed in the student study to simulation results based on a computational version of the Racial Norms Evolution model described in this section.
Empirical Measures and Empirical Results (N=555)
The difference between the four types of racial attitudes distinguished in section 2 may be illustrated by the historical example of Senator Strom Thurmond. His example suggests widely varying attitudes on the implicit and explicit idiosyncratic levels on one hand, and the implicit and explicit socially shared ones on the other. In a Dallas radio address in September 1948, Thurmond voiced his opposition to integration, bluntly warning that integrationists "will find … that in the lunchrooms, restrooms, recreation rooms, they will be compelled by law to mingle Further, he expressed his personal-social ambivalence in 1998 stating: "I've always held kindly to the black people … But it was just the custom and the law that they were separate, and if I held otherwise, I would have been in violation of the law" (cited in Stroud 2003) . That his first acknowledged fatherhood had been in violation of the very anti-miscegenation laws that
Thurmond had so desperately fought to maintain flies in the face of any attempt to explain political behavior rationally. It is, however, consistent with a neural model that allows different -even opposing -racial attitudes on the idiosyncratic and socially shared levels.
His initial attraction to Carrie Butler could be described as a result of idiosyncratic 'chemistry' resulting from the perception of internal body states and may well have been non-conscious (implicit idiosyncratic attitude). In addition, however, Thurmond seems to have consciously acknowledged his personal feelings (explicit idiosyncratic attitude) when he invited his daughter to the Governor's Mansion. His use of the term "Negro" with a negative connotation suggests the simultaneous non-conscious presence of negative, socially shared, racial associations (implicit socially shared attitude) and his conscious and demonstrative un-invitation of Virgin Island Governor Hastie suggests conscious endorsement of these negative attitudes (explicit socially shared attitude).
For the purpose of empirical study, a number of measurement methods exist that may be able to tap into the different types of attitudes distinguished here. Aron et al. (1991) developed a trait-based reaction time task to measure non-conscious feelings of closeness among individual partners in close relationships (implicit idiosyncratic attitudes). This method has been successfully applied to measure implicit feelings of closeness toward social groups (Coats et al. 2000 , Smith & Henry 1996 and will be described in greater detail in section 3.1. Explicit idiosyncratic attitudes are more difficult to measure in an empirical setting, especially if they deviate from social norms. Due to their private nature, people may be reluctant to express them to a stranger in a survey interview. In the future, it may be possible to apply in-depth interviewing by trusted friends to obtain measures of these feelings, but they are likely to remain the most elusive to empirical study. In order to measure non-conscious aspects of socially shared attitudes, racial priming measures are applied in this study (implicit socially shared attitudes).
These measures rely on association of word meaning (positive or negative), and are likely to be socially shared as an integral part of the communication process. The implicit racial priming measure applied for this study will be described in greater detail in section 3.2. Finally, explicit socially shared attitudes may be obtained by traditional survey measures. For the purpose of this study, questions like "How close do you feel towards African Americans?" and "How close do you feel towards White Americans?" were used, as were standard Feeling Thermometer ratings.
Survey responses allow participants sufficient time to consciously monitor their responses, and in a politically sensitive area, such as race, it is likely that some respondents will adjust their responses to conform to dominant social norms. In the following two sections, the two main implicit measurement procedures that were obtained for this study will be explained: implicit closeness towards African Americans and White Americans (section 3.1), and Implicit Racial Priming (section 3.2).
Measuring Idiosyncratic Racial Attitudes Implicitly
Idiosyncratic measures of closeness towards African Americans and White Americans were obtained utilizing a timed trait self-rating procedure developed by Arthur Aron and his collaborators (1991) . This measure operationalizes the idea that feelings of closeness may originate from an overlap of representations for the self and others in an individual's mind. Their reaction time based non-conscious measure was originally developed to measure feelings of closeness between partners in individual relationships and has been successfully applied to the group-level by Eliot R. Smith and Susan Henry (1996) , as well as Susan Coats and her collaborators (2000) . In both studies, the timed trait rating procedure was used to measure subjective closeness between the self and a non-political ingroup (a sorority or fraternity). Coats et al. (2000) also investigated whether the implicit closeness measure would correlate with explicit paper-and-pencil measures of closeness. They found a strong correspondence between conscious and non-conscious measures, a finding that does not seem surprising since the ingroups and outgroups they used (sororities and fraternities) appear innocuous from a social desirability point of view. Coats et al. (2000) write: "The advantages of implicit measures are obvious. They are not subject to self presentational or social desirability concerns. In addition, because implicit measures tap nonconscious, uncontrolled cognitive elements, they are less subject to demand characteristics" (Coats et al. 2000, p. 313) . This makes the application of this non-conscious (implicit closeness) measure particularly attractive to the sensitive area of race and politics.
The timed trait self-rating task proceeds in two steps, an initial trait survey, and, after a distracter task, the actual timed self-rating procedure (see figure 2 ). The first step is required for classification purposes (for a detailed description see below) while the actual non-conscious closeness measure is obtained in the second step. In the following paragraphs, both steps of the procedure will be described in detail. Readers who are less interested in the technical details of the measure may skip ahead to section 3.3 for a summary of the results.
In the first step of the procedure (see figure 2), each individual participant is asked to rate each of 90 personality trait words 3 as descriptive of the self, of "white Americans as a group,"
and of "African Americans as a group." Responses are given on a seven-point scale ranging from
(1) "not at all" to (7) "extremely" descriptive with option (4) labeled as "neutral." Based on these ratings, each trait is classified as either matching between the individual and a given group, or as mismatching. Note, although the meaning of the trait words themselves is likely to be socially shared, the question whether any given trait is descriptive of the respondent is highly idiosyncratic. Further, the self-and group ratings in this first step of the procedure are not used to measure closeness, they serve strictly for classification purposes of 'matching' and 'mismatching' traits between the self and a group in the mind of the respondent. The actual measure of closeness occurs in the second step of the procedure in the timed self-rating task that will be described below.
Implicit Closeness Measure
Based on Aron et al. (1991) • Step (1) Trait Survey: Rating Self, African Americans, and Whites on 90 Traits:
"CONSIDERATE" Is this trait descriptive of (you as an individual / African Americans as a group / white Americans as a group)? 1 = "Not at all"; 4="Moderately" 7 = "Extremely"
• Step (2) Timed Trait Rating Task: (after a distracter task and a break) Rating Self Only: 
traits from Aron et al. (1991) .
Step 2 Step 3: Implicit Closeness Score towards either African Americans or White Americans Implicit Closeness Score G i towards group G :
If the participant feels close to group G , the average reaction time for mismatching traits should be greater than that for matching traits ( The timed self-rating task is the most crucial component of the non-conscious closeness measure. Each of the 90 trait words appears on the computer screen and the participant is asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether each word is self-descriptive or not. The instructions read: "Ask yourself this question: 'Does this trait describe ME as an individual?'" followed by a trait word, e.g., "CONSIDERATE" (see figure 2) . The participant then presses a button labeled as "Yes" or "No" as quickly as possible to record the response. What renders the timed trait rating measure non-conscious is the fact that the timed trait description only refers to the self. No reference is made to groups at this point. The psychological phenomenon that makes this procedure viable as a non-conscious measure of closeness is the curious fact that distinct facilitation and inhibition patterns occur for groups the individual feels close to while no such patterns occur for groups the individual does not feel close to. If, in the mind of a respondent, the self shares a trait with a close group, the trait is significantly faster identified as self-descriptive (facilitation). If the self differs from a close group on a trait, the trait is significantly slower identified as self-descriptive (inhibition). No such facilitation or inhibition effects occur for groups that the individual does not feel close to.
To compute implicit closeness scores toward each group (see center and bottom panels in The characteristic facilitation and inhibition effects that occur for close others and groups are interpreted by Aron et al. (1991) as indicating an overlap between the self-representation and the representation of others in the mind of an individual, "an actual overlap or confusion of cognitive structures" (Aron et al. 1991, p. 249 ). They write: "A possible explanation of the … effect is that the cognitive structure of the self overlaps with the cognitive structure about the other … Thus when a trait is descriptive of self but not other, there is a bit of confusion in deciding whether it actually represents the self" (Aron et al. 1991 p. 248) .
Measuring Socially Shared Racial Attitudes Implicitly
In order to measure socially shared implicit racial attitudes, an implicit priming procedure was employed. The methodology of implicit priming was originally developed by James H. Neely (1977) and adapted for the purpose of measuring racial attitudes by Greenwald et al. (1995) , as well as Fazio et al. (1995) . The Implicit Association Test (IAT) developed by Greenwald et al.
(1995) and Fazio's et al. (1995) racial priming method differ in a number of respects, but they share the idea that the positive or negative meaning of a prime word that flashes up on the participant's computer screen is associated with the meaning of an otherwise unrelated target word. The participant is asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target word has a positive or negative meaning by pressing a button. Table 2 lists the prime and target words used for this study. In order to exclude conscious control on the part of the participant, prime words were displayed for a mere 20ms, too fast for conscious recognition. Thus, for participants, only the target words were consciously visible on the computer screen, appearing after a brief flash.
The target words were selected from M.M. In order to reduce the inevitable skewness associated with raw reaction time measures, all responses shorter than 250ms and exceeding 2500ms were eliminated (truncation). The truncated raw reaction time measures were log-transformed to further reduce skewness. The transformed reaction time measures were then converted to facilitation scores by subtracting the reaction times 6 Five positive and five negative words were chosen from this list of 1036 normed words. Race un-related words were chosen with a frequency of at least F=25 and valence ratings greater than 8 for positive words and less than 2 for negative ones. associated with racial prime-target pairs from neutral prime-target pairs. This was done for black and white prime words, as well as negative and positive target words separately. The neutral prime consisted of a white background with the character string "#########" displayed at the center of the computer screen. The facilitation score obtained in this way can be interpreted as the relative acceleration of responses following racial primes compared to neutral ones.
If t stands for the reaction time in milliseconds following a neutral prime and f stands for the facilitation score, then t / e f gives the reaction time in milliseconds following a racial prime.
For example, if a neural prime takes about 600ms and the facilitation score is .0168, the reaction time for the racial prime can be obtained by computing (600)/(e .0168 ) = 590. This represents a 10ms increase in reaction speed following the racial prime compared to the neutral one. The advantage of these relative facilitation scores over Fazio et al.'s (1995) raw facilitation scores is the fact that they eliminate individual differences in overall reaction time by looking at the relative value. (Non-truncated and non-log transformed raw facilitation scores show similar patterns at slightly lower levels of statistical significance). Republican partisanship is predictive of racially conservative opinions (p<.05) and the 'Motivation to Control Prejudice' is predictive of racially liberal opinions (p<.01). The latter coefficient suggests that participants who state that it is important to them to appear unprejudiced may over-exaggerate their support for race targeted policies such as affirmative action.
Results Based on 555 College Students
Interestingly, once implicit and explicit feelings of closeness toward racial groups are controlled for, racial and ethnic group membership ceases to exert any significant influence. The fact that implicit idiosyncratic feelings of closeness towards African Americans appear to be large and significant predictors of racial policy liberalism supports the construct validity of this implicit idiosyncratic measure. The fact, however, that racial priming measures appear to be unrelated to racial policy liberalism at first blush casts doubt on their validity as a measures of implicit socially shared racial attitudes. At closer inspection, however, their lack of predictive power and their lack of correlation with explicit measures of socially shared racial attitudes may not be so surprising. This lack of correlation is consistent with a large body of literature on the Implicit Association test, and it follows from the prediction of the Racial Norms Evolution Model presented in section 2. Thoroughly rehearsed socially shared attitudes should be universally shared due to the process of 'random drift' described by Kimura (1983, see section 2.3). As a universally shared attitude, it should take on a near constant value resulting in zero-correlations.
This lack of correlation between implicit priming measures has been described in the literature on the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al. 1995) . Greenwald et al. (2002) review a large volume of IAT evidence and find that dissociations between implicit and explicit attitudes using this measure have been confirmed in the area of race and ethnicity and have also been identified in the area of gender and age (Greenwald et al. 2002, p. 18) . While social desirability concerns may provide a plausible explanation for dissociation in this socially sensitive domain, the same explanation does not seem plausible as an explanation of low correlations in the area of flowers, musical instruments, insects, and weapons that formed the initial basis for the IAT measure in Greenwald et al. (1995) . The lack of correlation in the latter In order to compare the results of this study to the studies cited above, all racial attitude variables obtained in this study were converted into scores ranging from a pro-White extreme to a pro-Black one with zero representing the neutral midpoint (where attitudes towards African Americans and Whites are equal). To make the measures comparable, they were converted to z-scores and midpoint was preserved by adding the z-score for the neutral zero point to each original z-score. This z-score with neutral midpoint is denoted as z' = z+(0-mean)/st.dev. Figure   3 displays the z'-scores for the three racial attitude measures under consideration in this study.
Bars represented by white bars), no group differences are visible, instead all groups display a highly significant (p<.01) pro-White and anti-Black bias. This is consistent with the findings from the IAT literature cited above and supports the that reaction time procedures based on word-associations may tap universally shared, not necessarily individually endorsed, aspects of racial attitudes. In their inaugural presentation of the IAT methodology, Greenwald et al. (1995) support this interpretation by demonstrating that "IAT measures were highly sensitive to evaluative discriminations that are well established in the connotative meaning structure of the English language" (Greenwald et al. 1995 (Greenwald et al. , p. 1469 . The contrast that emerges, especially for African American participants, between their explicit socially shared attitudes (grey bar in figure   3 ) and their automatic word-associations (white bar) can be illustrated with a historical example:
In The significance tests in table 4 give the differences in group means for the measures in figure 3 (ANOVA F-Test for Racial Group Differences) and the overall deviation from the neutral zero-point within the entire sample (t-Test for Deviation of Grand Mean from Scale Midpoint). As would be expected for an implicit idiosyncratic measure (Implicit Closeness), no group differences emerge (see left hand panel in table 4) and no systematic racial bias can be detected (see right hand panel of table 4 ). In contrast, for the explicit measure of socially shared attitudes (Explicit Closeness), significant group differences emerge (left hand panel), and the sample mean is significantly and systematically biased in a pro-White and anti-Black direction (see negative t-test value in the right hand panel). Finally, for implicit socially shared attitudes (Racial Priming), no group differences can be distinguished (left hand panel), but a significant and systematic pro-White and anti-Black bias can be observed (see negative t-test value in the right hand panel of table 4). This is consistent with the universal IAT-effect observed in the IATliterature (Greenwald et al. 1995 , Dasgupta et al. 2000 , Jost et al. 2004 , Ashburn-Nardo et al. 2003 . In order to investigate the theoretical consistency of these empirical findings with the Model of Racial Norms Evolution presented in section 2, a computational version of the model is presented in the following section and simulated results are compared to the patterns observed in figure 3 and table 4. 
A Computational Model of Racial Norms Evolution
The computational model of Racial Norms Evolution simulates a population of the same size as the sample of college students in section 3 (N=555). Individuals are arranged on a two-dimensional grid of 15 x 37 cells. The racial composition of the simulated population reflects that of the college student sample in section 3 and group members are clustered to mimic racially segregated living arrangements frequently encountered in the contemporary United
States. Each individual is assumed to have two racial attitudes, one idiosyncratic, and one socially shared. Atttitudes are represented by random numbers between zero and one, whereby zero represents extremely pro-White and one extremely pro-Black attitudes. The midpoint of the scale represents neutrality where attitudes towards Whites and Blacks are equal. At the beginning of the simulation process attitudes are randomly initialized from a uniform distribution between zero and one, and idiosyncratic as well as socially shared attitudes are identical. Throughout the simulation process, idiosyncratic attitudes are kept constant, while socially shared attitudes are subject to change through random persuasion. In each simulation round t, one individual is selected at random to be the 'persuader' I t and one of the direct neighbors in the grid is randomly selected as the 'persuadee' J t . The persuadee takes on the socially shared attitude of the persuader, so that J t = I t . There is a probability of taking on one's own idiosyncratic attitude as socially shared attitude instead of the persuader's attitude and this probability is denoted by p(idiosyncratic). This probability is set at different values during five simulations ranging from p(idiosyncratic) =0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, to p(idiosyncratic) =1.00. At one extreme, at p(idiosyncratic)=0.00, individuals never express their idiosyncratic racial attitudes and are maximally susceptible to persuasion by others. At the other extreme where p(idiosyncratic)=1.00 they express only their idiosyncratic attitudes and are entirely immune to persuasion by others.
The implicit-explicit dimension is represented by time (the number of persuasion rounds).
Applying the Hebbian interpretation of attitude rehearsal, attitudes that have been rehearsed for longer periods of time should become automatic (implicit). Thus, simulated attitudes after 50,000 persuasion rounds might represent explicit socially shared attitudes, while simulated attitudes after 300,000 rounds might represent implicit socially shared norms. Table 5 presents the results of the five simulations described above. Each square in the matrices represents the socially shared racial attitude, one individual color coded to represent the most pro-African American attitudes as bright red, and the most pro-White American attitudes as black. For each simulation, the initial distribution at round 1 is displayed on the left, the results after 50,000 persuasion rounds in the middle, and after 300,000 persuasion rounds on the right. represents simulation 1 for which the p(idiosyncratic) was set at zero. Invariably, under this setting a single attitude survives and the simulation comes to an end once no further changes are possible. The bar chart shows initial (idiosyncratic) attitudes (black bars) not differing significantly from the neutral midpoint of the racial attitude scale. After 50,000 persuasion rounds (see grey bars) significant group differences have emerged, with some groups taking on norms that deviate from the neutral midpoint in a positive direction, and others in a negative direction.
After 300,000 persuasion rounds, all groups have adopted a universally pro-White and anti-Black norm. The graph on the right hand side of the top panel in figure 4 plots the mean (bold black line) and the standard deviation (thin black line) of racial attitudes for the entire duration of simulation 1. It illustrates how the mean starts off at the neutral midpoint initially, veers off the neutral midpoint for a while, until it reaches an equilibrium state far off the neutral midpoint. As the norm crystallizes, the standard deviation gradually decreases over the first third of the evolution (about 300,000 rounds), and remains just above zero for the remainder of the simulation until the last individual adopts the social norm in round 950,000 and the standard deviation goes to zero. This is the process of random drift described in Kimura's (1983) Neutral Theory of Evolution. The only prediction that can be made with certainty in this random model is the fact that a norm will evolve -the direction of the norm is entirely unpredictable, as is the question how far away from the neutral midpoint it will fall. The process becomes indefinite once idiosyncratic attitudes supply a constant supply of new minority attitudes. A large number of simulations were run apart from the simulations displayed in table 5 to ensure that the results are not simply peculiar patterns, but predictably reoccurring patterns. When the bar graphs for the four simulations are compared for which p(idiosyncratic)<1.00, the results are surprisingly similar. In each case, initial idiosyncratic attitudes (black bars) are, on average, close to the neutral midpoint without significant group differences, after 50,000 persuasion rounds (grey bars), socially shared attitudes display significant group differences and bars point in different directions. Finally, after 300,000 persuasion rounds, white bars generally point in the same direction (universal norm) and are significantly different from the neutral midpoint for most 
Pro-White
Pro-Black groups. The only exception is simulation 5 for which p(idiosyncratic)=1.00 and social influences are ruled out by definition. In this case the initial idiosyncratic distribution remains constant, no group differences occur, and no universal norm emerges that is significantly different from the neutral midpoint. Although the simulated process has been a highly simplified and parsimonious version of a real world process, the complex patterns that emerge display some surprising similarities to observed data.
Conclusions
The theoretical model of Racial Norms Evolution presented here combines two assumptions of neural organization with one assumption about social communication processes. The first of these assumptions holds that perceptions of internal body states ('chemistry' or idiosyncratic attitudes), and perceptions of external stimuli (socially shared attitudes) are processed in different (yet interconnected) areas of the brain. The second assumption holds that attitudes rehearsed for a longer period of time become automatic by a process of Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949 , see also Wilson et al. 2000) . This leads to a two-by-two classification of attitudes, (1) implicit idiosyncratic, (2) explicit idiosyncratic, (3) implicit socially shared, and (4) explicit socially shared, three of which were considered in this study (1, 3, and 4) . The third assumption of the model holds that social communication can produce social norms by virtue of a process that has been described by Kimura (1983) as 'random drift'. The tendency for computational models of social communication processes to produce unanimity as a function of random rather than systematic processes has been noted with puzzlement by some social scientists. Andrzej Nowak et al. (1990) , for example, criticize: "the implicit null hypothesis seemingly held by most social psychologists is that group processes, if allowed to work themselves through to their conclusion, would lead to a final distribution of opinion … with zero variance" (Nowak et al. 1990, p. 363) .
Due to the fact that public opinion research generally focuses on divisive issues rather than unanimous ones, this general tendency of random norms evolution has been dismissed by political scientists as an anomaly and several computational modelers have sought to limit this tendency by including restrictive elements in their models. Nowak et al. (1990) , for example, propose a computer model in which stable local 'pockets' of dissent remain due to the fact that some members of the society have zero persuasiveness. Similarly, Robert Axelrod (1997) proposes a model for the dissemination of culture in which communication is a function of 'similarity' between two individuals and stable pockets of dissent remain if similarity between some individuals is set to zero: "If they are completely different, they will not even interact" (Axelrod 1997, p. 211) . In practice, however, it is hard to imagine what 'zero similarity' between two people could mean, since they will at least share their common humanity. Similarly, it is hard to imagine what 'zero persuasiveness' means as long as a human being is able to communicate at all. Despite these rather strong and restrictive assumptions these models do not produce stable opinion splits close to the 50 percent mark typical for the ones identified in many public opinion surveys, but produce rather small pockets of dissenting views and sometimes none at all. This paper takes a different approach and allows for the possibility that this general tendency of random norms evolution may have a parallel in real world communication processes. It may help us explain the otherwise puzzling observation that people adjust their views to powerful social norms (e.g., Devine 1989 , Terkildsen 1993 , Fazio et al. 1995 , Greenwald et al. 1995 , Kuklinski et al. 1997 , Berinsky 2004 , Feldman & Huddy 2005 . If we assume that social norms are simply an additive function of individual attitudes, no systematic differences should occur between average idiosyncratic and average socially shared attitudes.
According to the college student experiment described in section 3, no systematic racial bias is observable at the level of implicit idiosyncratic measures (Implicit Closeness), while a significant anti-Black bias is observable at the level of both explicit and implicit socially shared attitudes (Explicit Closeness, and Racial Priming respectively). The simulation results presented in section 4 faithfully replicate these patterns as long as social communication is possible at all, i.e., as long as p(idiosyncratic)<1.00. The model is maximally parsimonious, holding idiosyncratic attitudes constant, and allowing changes in socially shared attitudes due to random persuasion among neighbors. More sophisticated versions of the computational model could allow for random change in idiosyncratic attitudes, and it could allow for individual differences in p(idiosyncratic). While these changes might lead to more realistic results, it is noteworthy that a maximally parsimonious baseline model suffices to produce considerable similarity between observed and simulated racial attitude data. Due to its parsimony, the Model of Racial Norms Evolution presented here may serve as a null model against which more complex models can be tested. Because of past discrimination, minorities should be given special consideration when decisions are made about hiring applicants for jobs -do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?
Appendix:
RP 2:
The government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the socioeconomic position of Blacks and minority groups -do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? RP 3:
Where would you place the government in Washington's efforts to improve the social and economic position of Blacks and other minority groups on a scale ... where 1= the government should not make any special effort, and 7 = the government should make every possible effort?
RP 4:
The government should not make any special effort to help Blacks and other minorities because they should help themselves -do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? The responses are summed up and recoded so that greater numbers represent greater racial policy liberalism and smaller numbers greater racial policy conservatism. Source for question wording: NES, NBES, see Tate (1993) 
